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1 Introduction
In a well known contribution in 2005 Rajan [29] highlighted the potential increase in risk contagion
emerging from nance and banking globalization. This view, visionary at the time, seemed to
be conrmed when in 2008 the failure of one big globalized bank, Lehmann Brothers, had large
cascading e¤ects on the entire banking system. While venturing into foreign markets might foster
banksopportunities to improve risk-sharing and to increase protsmargins, globalization might
have unintended consequences in terms of risk-taking. A recent IMF Financial Stability Report
[24] as well as several other studies (reviewed in the next section) provide a more nuanced view.
Empirical evidence shows that, prior to the 2007 nancial crisis, global risk had increased since much
of the nancial globalization had taken place through cross-border activity with little involvement
of global banks into local retail activity. On the contrary, after 2007 there has been a shift in the
business model of global banks, which currently tend to operate more through subsidiaries (and
occasionally through branches). Banksdirect involvement in the local retail activity implies that
local competition can exert a higher discipline role. Evidence shows that this type of foreign banks
entry (so called bricks and mortar) may indeed reduce risk-taking.
While the complex and multifaceted nature of banking globalization is high in the agenda of
academics and policy makers working on crisis prevention, the literature still lacks a theoretical
framework to examine those issues in a unied way. The aim of this paper is to make a rst step
in that direction. In particular, we propose a model of multinational banking in which imperfectly
competitive banks operate simultaneously in di¤erent national markets being directly involved in
local retail activities both on the depositsand the loanssides. Key elements are an endogenous
risk-taking and an endogenous dynamic entry decision. Our main goal is to study the impact of
multinational banking on risk-taking through its e¤ects on local competition in the deposit and loan
markets. In doing so we also examine how entry barriers a¤ect endogenous entry and risk-taking,
which gives insights into the role of international agreements such as those on pass-porting rights
within the European Union. We develop our analysis in deterministic and stochastic environments
with systematic and idiosyncratic shocks as well as perfectly and imperfectly correlated loan fail-
ures. We show that multinational banking can reduce risk-taking by promoting local competition.
2
This happens as long as the expansionary impact of competition on multinational banksaggregate
prots through larger scale is strong enough to o¤set its parallel contractionary impact through
lower lending-to-deposit rate spread. This result holds with both perfectly and imperfectly corre-
lated loansfailures. When multinational banking reduces risk-taking, its also moderates the credit
crunch that follows a deterioration in the investment climate. We also show that, compared with
multinational banking, the benecial e¤ect of cross-border lending on risk-taking is weaker.
Our benchmark model features a banking industry with endogenous entry and endogenous
risk taking in which home and foreign multinational banks co-exist in segmented national markets.
In examining the interactions among competition, risk taking and globalization, we model glob-
alization as a fall or a removal of the additional costs of banksforeign operations leading to an
increase in their relative market share in foreign markets. Lower costs of foreign operation can be
interpreted as the result of signing an agreement such as those on EU pass-porting rights. In each
national market banks raise funds through deposits and use them to nance rmsprojects through
loans. Banks are thus directly involved in local loansmonitoring activity and compete for local
funds. Firms acquire bank loans to invest in risky investment projects, with higher investment
returns being associated with higher failure probability. Given the return on loans, rms choose
both the amount of loans and the projectsrisk-return proles. Due to moral hazard originating
from limited liability, when confronted with higher loan rates rmsincentives toward risk-shifting
are higher. This endogenously increases risk-taking as rms invest more in tail risk. Banks act as
Cournot oligopolist in the loan market and as Cournot oligopsonist in the deposit market. Entry
decisions in each national market are endogenous as banks compare the sum of future discounted
prots with entry costs. Banks face additional costs when operating in a foreign market due to less
e¢ cient monitoring. This assumption is introduced to capture the idea that banksmonitoring abil-
ities in foreign jurisdictions are typically impaired. As a result high monitoring costs are associated
with a smaller market share for foreign banks. However, as those costs fall due to globalization,
banksmarket shares in foreign markets increase thereby fostering competition for domestic banks.
In general tougher competition has an ambiguous impact on risk-taking. Ambiguity arises
from the presence of two opposite e¤ects associated with banks being simultaneously oligopsonist
in the market for short-term funding and oligopolist in the loan market. On the one hand, tougher
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competition in the deposit market increases the return on deposits. Banks have to o¤er higher
deposit rates to attract funds. In isolation this rst e¤ect would trigger an increase in loan rates,
which in turn would increase risk-taking due to rmslimited liability. On the other hand, tougher
competition in the loan market decreases the return on loans. Banks have to o¤er lower loan rates
to attract rms. In isolation this second e¤ect would mitigate rmsrisk-taking. Hence, in general,
whether banksinternationalization reduces or increases risk-taking through tougher competition
depends upon the balance in the extent of competition in the deposit and the loansmarket. Under
generally accepted functional forms,1 the second e¤ect tends to prevail so that the predictions of the
model are consistent with the ndings by the IMF [24] report, namely that banking globalization
with direct involvement in retail activities reduces risk-taking.2 We show that, in the deterministic
equilibrium of the benchmark model with no shocks, an increase in banking globalization (measured
by a fall in monitoring costs) increases loan supply and decreases rmsrisk-shifting incentives, thus
reducing risk-taking. This result is conrmed in a stochastic equilibrium of the benchmark model in
which rms are hit by aggregate shocks happening before banks make their loan portfolio decisions.
For comparison, we also explore the deterministic equilibrium of a variant of the benchmark
model in which banks cannot raise deposits abroad and thus operate as cross-border lenders. We
show that also competition through cross-border lending reduces risk-taking, though to a smaller
extent than multinational banking. Finally, we introduce partially correlated projects failures
modelled as in Vasicek [31]. With general functional forms for downward-sloping loan demand
and upward-sloping deposit supply, we show that the return on loans falls with the intensity of
competition as long as the aggregate prot of the banking sector increases. This happens when
the scale enhancing e¤ect of competition on aggregate deposits dominates its downward pressure
on banksprot margins.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares our paper with the existing
literature. Section 3 describes the benchmark model of multinational banking. Section 4 solves the
1We follow Boyd and De Nicolo [4] and Martinez-Miera and Repullo [26] in assuming linear functional forms
for the demand of loans, the supply of deposits and the relation between projectsreturns and risk, an assumption
compatible with decreasing hazard rates.
2Further evidence on the fact that banksexpansion through bricks and mortar business model reduces risk is given
in Goetz, Laeven and Levine [20] and Levine, Lin and Xie [25] for the US and by Faia, Ottaviano and Sanchez-Arjona
[18], who construct a novel dataset for European GSIBs.
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model and analyzes its predictions analytically and numerically in the deterministic and stochastic
environments. Section 5 and 6 extend the benchmark model to compare multinational banking with
cross-border lending and to allow for imperfectly correlated projectsfailures. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is primarily connected to the banking literature that studies the role of competition for
risk-taking. This literature focuses on Cournot-Nash competition in closed economy. Allen and
Gale [1] analyze competition among banks that can choose the level of assetsrisk and show that
more competition leads to more risk-taking. Their model hinges on competition in the deposit
market. Banks seeking to attract deposits in a tougher competitive setting are forced to o¤er
higher deposit rates. This forces banks to search for yield in assets, thus encouraging risk-taking.
Furthermore, Allen and Gale [2] use a general equilibrium model of nancial intermediation to
show that instability in competitive banking systems is constrained e¢ cient, thereby concluding
that there is no trade o¤ between risk and e¢ ciency. Di¤erently, Boyd and De Nicolo [4] highlight
a di¤erent channel through which more competition in the loan market reduces loan rates, thus
inducing rms to select projects with lower returns but also lower risk. Through this channel,
competition may improve the average quality of the loansapplicants and reduce adverse selection
(see also Stiglitz and Weiss [30]). In the same vein, Martinez-Miera and Repullo [26] revisit the
insights of Boyd and De Nicolo [4] when the correlation of projectsfailures is imperfect as in Vasicek
[31] rather than perfect as in the original paper. They note that lower loan rates reduce banks
prot margins from non-defaulting loans, which generates a U-shaped relation between competition
and banksaggregate failure rate (systemic risk). In all these papers changes in competition are
only exogenous, while we also consider endogenous entry and how this interacts with endogenous
risk-taking. Also in none of the above paper the bank has the choice between domestic and foreign
markets, something which in our case creates dumpingincentives as in Brander and Krugman [5]:
in the presence of monitoring costs that hamper foreign operations banks are willing to accept a
smaller lending-to-deposit rate spread in their foreign than in their domestic markets.
Our paper speaks to the emerging empirical literature on the role of global banks in the
recent crisis. For instance, Cetorelli and Goldberg [9] and [10] study liquidity management by
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global banks during the Great Recession and focus on the interaction with the monetary policy
transmission mechanism. They show that banks manage liquidity optimally on a global scale by
shifting it where it is most needed. They focus on banks that are already global and do not
investigate the factors that might induce banks to enter foreign markets.3
More generally, our model also helps rationalize a number of results obtained by the empirical
literature studying global banking. First and foremost, many papers nd that negative shocks like
the crisis tend to reduce cross-border lending, but not the presence of foreign banks (see, e.g., the
survey by Claessens and van Horen [11] and Claessens and van Horen [12]). That is why, even after
2007, banksglobalization has remained a widespread phenomenon with far reaching consequences
for risk and nancial stability. This literature also explores the link between bank globalization
on the one hand and credit condition or nancial stability on the other. Evidence shows that the
presence of foreign banks helps reduce the cost of credit and risk-taking and thus facilitate nancial
stability, the more so the lower the entry barriers and the higher the information e¢ ciency of the
destination markets.4 Lower entry barriers increase competition. If the loan competition channel
prevails, banksrisk-taking falls. Further evidence exists on the fact that expansion through bricks
and mortaractivity might reduce risk-taking. For instance, in the case of US banks Goetz, Laeven
and Levine [20] and Levine, Lin and Xie [25] nd that geographic expansion (within the US) reduces
banksrisk-taking due to a diversication channel. In the case of European GSIBs, Faia, Ottaviano
and Sanchez-Arjona [18] test the impact of banksforeign expansion on both individual bank risk
(measured through CDS prices and/or loan loss provisions over assets) and systemic risk (measured
with metrics of marginal capital short-fall and/or CoVaR) comparing the roles of the competition,
the diversication and the regulation channels. They nd that foreign expansion (though bricks and
mortar) reduces all risk metrics. Our paper provides a theoretical underpinning to these empirical
ndings as well as to the observed asymmetric reactions of cross-border lenders and multinational
banks to negative shocks in the destination market, with the former typically retreating more than
the latter.5
Finally, very few papers analyze the theoretical underpinnings of global banking. Bruno and
3See also the papers in Buch and Goldberg [8] for a recent overview.
4See Claessens et al. [14], Berger et al. [3], Giannetti and Ongena [19].
5See Claessens and van Horen [13].
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Shin [6] build a model of the international banking system where global banks raise short term
funds (deposits) at worldwide level, but interact with local banks for loans production. Di¤er-
ently from us they focus on banksleverage cycle. Niepman [28] proposes a perfectly competitive
model of banking across borders, in which the pattern of foreign bank asset and liability hold-
ings emerges endogenously because of international di¤erences in relative factor endowments and
banking e¢ ciency. Competition and risk-shifting are not part of the analysis. De Blas and Russ
[15] investigate whether foreign participation in the banking sector increases real output. Using
a general equilibrium model of heterogeneous, Bertrand competitive lenders and a simple search
process, they show that lending-to-deposit rate spreads can increase with FDI whereas the lend-
ing rates remain largely unchanged or even fall. They also contrast the competitive e¤ects from
cross-border bank takeovers with those of cross-border lending. Di¤erently from us, they do not
emphasize risk-shifting in the presence of limited liability.6
3 A Model of Multinational Banking
Consider a banking sector that operates in two symmetric national markets, called H and F . Banks
raise deposits from households and extend loans for investment projects. They are headquartered in
only one of the two markets but can operate in both, choosing the risk-return prole that maximizes
local prots. However, when they operate in the market they are not headquartered in, banks face
an additional monitoring cost on loans  > 0. We use Nat;H and N
a
t;F to denote the numbers of
active banks that at any time t are headquartered in H and F respectively, and Nat = N
a
t;H +N
a
t;F
to denote the resulting total number of active banks. These numbers are determined by endogenous
entry at xed cost  > 0, which subsumes a bank entry cost b > 0 and a subsidiary setup cost
d > 0 for each market the bank operates in ( = b + 2d). The model will therefore feature both
endogenous entry and endogenous risk-taking. As the two markets are symmetric, for conciseness
of exposition we will focus on the description of market H with analogous expressions holding for
market F .
6See Hale and Russ [16] for a recent overview of related works.
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3.1 BanksEntry and Exit
In each period t the number of active banks is determined endogenously by entry and exit as follows.
Entry requires establishing a headquarter in one of the two national markets and a subsidiary in
each market at the overall xed cost  > 0. A constant discount factor  2 (0; 1) captures the
exogenous per period opportunity cost associated with nancing  in an un-modelled international
capital market. The fact that  is constant means that the two national banking markets we focus
on are smallwith respect to the international capital market and thus nancing conditions in the
latter are not a¤ected by banks decisions in the former. Banks become active as soon as they enter.
Exit does not incur any additional cost. It can be voluntary when it is a bank that decides to leave,
or involuntary as long as each period banks face an exogenous death rate % 2 (0; 1).
Accordingly, active banks consist of incumbents that survived from the previous period and
new entrants. If we use Nt 1;H and N et;H to denote the numbers of incumbent and entrant banks
headquartered in H in period t, we have that the corresponding number of active banks is:
Nat;H = Nt 1;H +N
e
t;H =
Nt;H
1  % (1)
Note that, due to exogenous death, the number of incumbents in any period is only a share
1  % of the number of active banks in the previous period.
In deciding whether to enter or not, banks compare the xed entry cost  with the total present
expected value of future per-period prots. Let z;HH and z;HF be the per-period prots that a
bank headquartered in H earns in period z from operations in markets H and F . Then, if we use
Vt;H to denote the value of being active at time t for a bank headquartered in H, we can write the
total sum of its future discounted prots recursively as:
Vt;H = t;HH + t;HF + (1  %)Et fVt+1;Hg : (2)
As entry happens instantaneously, the model will feature no transitional dynamics. Free entry
therefore implies that in any instant t the value of being active will be equal to the overall entry cost:
Vt;H = . We will consider two cases, a stochastic environment and a deterministic environment in
which banksprots per period are constant and equal to the annuity value of that cost:
HH + HF = [1  (1  %)]; (3)
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which shows that the larger are the xed entry cost , the opportunity cost  of nancing
entry and the death rate %, the larger prots have to be in order to justify entry. Analogous results
hold for banks headquartered in country F .
3.2 Banks, Firms and Depositors
Banks act as intermediaries between depositors and investors (rms), acting as oligopsonist vis-
à-vis the former and as oligopolist vis-à-vis the latter. In both cases they behave as Cournot-Nash
competitors. For simplicity, we assume that: (i) rms do not have internal funds and banks are
their only source of funds; (ii) banks can only nance rms using own deposits; (iii) depositors
can only use their funds for deposits. Moreover, we assume that both home and foreign banks can
nance home rms using local deposits only. This assumption reects well the reality of the bricks
and mortar business model, in which liquidity cannot be moved easily across branches/subsidiaries.
Banks optimize in each destination markets separately. Markets will be linked only through the
banks free entry condition. Note that strategic interactions and rmsand banksoptimization
takes place within a period, hence in what follows we will leave the time index implicit.
While banks and rms are risk neutral, depositors are risk averse households with concave
utility function of their consumption. Deposits are insured by banks at a at rate deposit insurance
premium  > 0. This implies that in market H the total supply of deposits DTH as well as the return
on deposits rDH do not depend on the riskiness of banksportfolios: depositors only care about
the expected return of deposits, as they will not bear banks asset losses due to the insurance.
Notice that the presence of the insurance, by expanding the banks limited liability region, also
contributes to the banksrisk-taking incentives. We will return on this point later again. Thus, the
(inverse) supply of deposits can be characterized as a return function of DTH only. This function
rDH = r
D
 
DTH

is assumed to satisfy rD (0)  0 and to be twice di¤erentiable with rD0  DTH > 0
and rD00
 
DTH
  0. Using DHH and DFH to denote the deposits raised by home and foreign banks
respectively, we have DTH = DHH +DFH .
Notice that households could potentially invest in rmsprojects by themselves. In this case,
however, they would receive a risky return. By investing in insured banksdeposits, they receive
instead a xed return, which better suits their risk averse preferences. Hence, the main role of banks
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in the model is that of risk insurance providers. Risk neutral banks collect deposits, invest them in
risky assets by diversifying and provide a xed returns to risk averse depositors. Importantly the
deposit insurance plays the role of bank capital in our model: the insurance fee is proportional to
assets and the insurance fund is the rst in the pecking order of loss absorbing assets.
In each national market rms have access to a set of constant-return risky technologies
(projects) with xed output normalized to 1. For market H, projects are indexed rIH yielding
arIH with probability p(r
I
H ; a) for r
I
H 2 [0; rI ] and 0 otherwise, where a is an aggregate shock. We
assume that this shock is common across markets in order to insulate our analysis of the e¤ects
of global banking on risk-taking channeled through competition from those channeled through risk
diversication. Probability p(rIH ; a) satises p(0; a) = 1, p(r
I ; a) = 0, p1(rIH ; a) < 0, p11(r
I
H ; a)  0
for all rIH 2 [0; rI ] so that p(rIH ; a)arIH is strictly concave in rIH . It also satises p2(rIH ; a) > 0 and
p12(r
I
H ; a)  0. Accordingly, for given a, the probability of success decreases more than propor-
tionately as projects returns increase, while it (weakly) increases as a increases. Moreover, the
positive impact of larger a on rIH is (weakly) stronger for larger r
I
H so that higher return projects
with lower probability of success benet (weakly) more than proportionately from favourable ag-
gregate shocks. The choice of projects by rms is unobservable to banks, which can only observe
(at no cost) whether projects have been successful (rIH > 0) or not (r
I
H = 0). As rms are risk
neutral, in each national market the total demand of loans LTH = LHH + LFH (with LHH and
LFH denoting the supply of loans from home and foreign banks respectively) as well as their return
rLH do not depend on the riskiness of rmsprojects. The (inverse) demand of loans can then be
characterized as a return function of LTH only. This function r
L
H = r
L
 
LTH

is assumed to satisfy
rL (0) > 0 and to be twice di¤erentiable with rL0
 
LTH

< 0, rL00
 
LTH
  0 and rL (0) > rD (0).
Finally, as banks can only nance loans through deposits and rms can only nance projects
through bank loans, the total amounts of rmsinvestments ITH , banksloans L
T
H and deposits D
T
H
have to be the same: ITH = L
T
H = D
T
H ; where the total amount of investments nanced by home
and foreign banks is ITH = IHH + IFH .
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3.3 FirmsDecisions
The rmsdecisions can actually be characterized in two stages. In the rst stage rms choose
the risk-return prole of their investment. This leads to the endogenous risk characterizing the
economy. Given the investment decisions in a second stage rms decide on their loansdemand.
3.3.1 FirmsRisk and Investment Decisions
We introduce moral hazard by assuming that rms have limited liability in that they repay their
loans only if their projects are successful. Those elements imply that rms have an incentive to
risk-shifting, the more so the higher is the cost of credit. We follow in this respect the tradition of
Stiglitz and Weiss [30] or Jensen and Meckling [22]. This implies that, given risk neutrality, a rm
(in the H market) chooses rIH in order to maximize expected per period prots:
p(rIH ; a)(ar
I
H   rLH); (4)
as failure happens with probability 1   p(rIH ; a) but does not require any loan repayment.7
Note that, given the monotonic relation between p(rIH ; a) and r
I
H , choosing r
I
H is equivalent to
choosing p(rIH ; a). In this respect, rms choose the risk-return proleof investments for given
return on loans rLH (and given a).
The rst order condition for a rm maximizing (4) is:
p(rIH ; a)a+ p1(r
I
H ; a)(ar
I
H   rLH) = 0; (5)
which shows that rms trade o¤ higher return (p(rIH ; a)a > 0) and lower success probability
(p1(rIH ; a)(ar
I
H   rLH) < 0). Making the dependence of rLH on LTH explicit allows us to rewrite (5)
as:
p(rIH ; a)a
p1(rIH ; a)
+ arIH = r
L
 
LTH

; (6)
which expresses the return on investment rIH (and thus also risk 1   p(rIH ; a)) as an implicit
function of aggregate loans LTH with exogenous parameter a. In particular, (6) shows that, by
7We could alternatively assume that rms earn a xed amount (1   c) with probability 1   p(rIH ; aH). This,
however, would not change the main incentives faced by rms and banks. Indeed, in case of failure rms would be
unable to repay the loans, banks would repossess the amount left (1  p(rIH ; aH))(1  c) and rms would receive zero.
The proceeds earned by banks would then enter banksprots and their rst order conditions would be simply scaled
up by (1  p(rIH ; aH))(1  c).
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a¤ecting LTH , banks indirectly command the return-risk prole chosen by rms. Specically, given
the functional properties of rL
 
LTH

and p(rIH ; a), a contraction in bank credit (smaller L
T
H) induces
rms to select a more aggressiveinvestment prole characterized by higher return and higher risk
(i.e., larger rIH and larger p(r
I
H ; a)).
8 Larger a has the same qualitative e¤ects on rms choice
due to its disproportionate boost to high-return high-risk projects.9 Hence, by disproportionately
boosting the probability on the upper tail of the projectsreturns distribution, larger a increases
rmsexuberance. The choice of rms in the F market is equivalent.
3.3.2 FirmsLoans Decisions
Given the risk-return decisions on investment rms formulate their optimal loan demand. Firms
get funds and invest only in one country. We assume that there is continuum of entrepreneurs
whose outside option h follows a distribution G(h): Each entrepreneur will fund investment with
outside funding to the extent that their expected optimal prot is larger than their outside option.
In this context the total demand for loans is equal to the total mass of entrepreneurs that invest:
LTH = G(
hH) = G(p(r
I
H ; a)(ar
I
H   rLH)): (7)
Additional details on how to derive this result can be found in Appendix A, where we also show
that the loan demand implicitly dened by (7) satises rL0(LTH) < 0 and r
L00(LTH)  0: Intuitively,
as the mass of borrowing rms rises, the surplus of the marginal rm falls. In turn, this rm will
be willing to pay lower rates.
3.4 BanksDecisions on Deposits and Loans
As banks can only nance local loans by own local deposits, in market H the loans Lr;HH (Lr;FH)
of any home (foreign) bank r have to exactly match its deposits Dr;HH (Dr;FH). This implies
Lr;HH = Dr;HH (Lr;FH = Dr;FH) with DHH =
PNH
r=1Dr;HH (DFH =
PNH
r=1DFH) so that Lr;HH
or Dr;HH (Lr;FH or Dr;FH) can be equivalently chosen as a home (foreign) banks choice variable.
In what follows, we will choose Lr;HH (Lr;FH). Then, Cournot-Nash behavior requires each home
(foreign) bank r to take into account its individual impacts through LTH on both the return on
8The crucial restriction here is p11(rIH ; aH) < 0.
9The crucial restriction here is p12(rIH ; aH)  0.
12
deposits rD
 
LTH

= rD
 
DTH

and the return on loans rL
 
LTH

when choosing its amount of loans
Lr;HH (Lr;FH).
Each period starts with a certain number of incumbent banks operating in both markets. The
timing of ensuing events for market H is as follows. First, the aggregate shock a is realized. Second,
based on the number of incumbents and the realization of a, new banks may decide to enter bringing
the total number of active banks toNa = N= (1  %) withNaH = NH= (1  %) andNaF = NF = (1  %)
(see the law of motion (1)). Third, active banks simultaneously choose the amounts of loans Lr;HH
(Lr;FH) in market H separately from market F (due to their segmentation). Aggregation of these
simultaneous individual decisions up to LTH determines loans and deposits returns r
L
H and r
D
H .
Fourth, based on rLH and the realization of a, rms design their risk-return proles by choosing r
I
H
or equivalently p(rIH ; a). Fifth, uncertainty over projectsoutcomes is resolved. Successful rms
repay their loans and, whatever happens, depositors receive return rDH thanks to full insurance.
Finally, exogenous exit takes place at rate %. Surviving banks become the incumbents at the
beginning of the next period.
Given this timing, the backward solution of the model requires us rst to characterize the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of loan extension (deposit collection) for given numbers of active banks
and then to endogenize those numbers through the entry condition (3).
3.4.1 BanksOptimization Problem
Due to market segmentation, banks maximize prots independently in the to markets. In the case
of market H, a bank r headquartered in H chooses Lr;HH to maximize
r;HH = p(r
I
H ; a)
 
rL
 
LTH

Lr;HH   rD(DTH)Dr;HH   Dr;HH

;
whereas a bank s headquartered in F chooses Ls;FH to maximize:
s;FH = p(r
I
H ; a)
 
rL
 
LTH

Ls;FH   rD(DTH)Ds;FH   Ds;FF   Ls;FH

;
subject to the constraint that local loans must match deposits loans:
Lr;HH = Dr;HH , Ls;FH = Ds;FH
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as well as to the rmsrst order condition (6), which implicitly denes the return of investment
chosen by rms as a function of the loan rate: rIH = r
I
 
rL
 
DTH

. In doing so, rms are aware
that their individual decisions a¤ect aggregate loans (deposits):
LTH =
X
r
Lr;HH +
X
s
Ls;FH
DTH =
X
r
Dr;HH +
X
s
Ds;FH
with LTH = D
T
H .
The rst order condition for domestic bank r (for the domestic market) is:
dr;HH
dLr;HH
= p(rIH ; a)
 
rL
 
LTH
  rD(LTH)  + (8)
+p(rIH ; a)
 
rL0
 
LTH
  rD0(LTH)Lr;HH +
+p1(r
I
H ; a)r
I0  rL  LTH rL0  LTH  rL  LTH  rD(LTH)  Lr;HH = 0
After the rst equality, the rst term is the scale e¤ect. It is positive and represents the
marginal gain from increasing one unit of bank scale (as measured by the total amount of loans
and deposits). The second term is the competition e¤ect. It is negative and captures the impacts
of larger bank scale on deposit return (rD0
 
LTH

> 0) and loan return (rL0
 
LTH

< 0). More
deposits and loans lead to a rise in the rate on deposits and a fall in the rate on loans. The third
and last term is the risk-taking e¤ect. It is positive and captures the e¤ects of competition on the
risk-return investment prole of rms. More loans decrease the loan rate and this in turn induces
rms to select proles associated with lower return and higher probability of success.
The prot maximizing choice of loans by foreign bank s (for the domestic market) satises an
analogous rst order condition:
ds;FH
dLs;FH
= p(rIH ; a)
 
rL
 
LTH
  rD(LTH)  + (9)
+p(rIH ; a)
 
rL0
 
LTH
  rD0(LTH)Lr;FH +
+p1(r
I
H ; a)r
I0  rL  LTH rL0  LTH  rL  LTH  rD(LTH)     Ls;FH = 0
which di¤ers from (8) only for the presence of the additional monitoring cost . Analogous
conditions hold for market F .
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3.4.2 Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
We focus on a symmetric outcome in which in each market all home banks achieve the same scale
Lr;HH = Ls;FF = ` and all foreign banks achieve the same scale Ls;FH = Lr;HF = `. In this case,
in each market total loans (and deposits) are:
LT =
N
1  % (`+ `
) : (10)
For given N , in each market the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (in any period t) is characterized
by the solution of the following system of two equations in the two unknown scales ` and `:
p(rI ; a)
 
rL
 
LT
  rD(LT )  + (11)
+p(rI ; a)
 
rL0
 
LT
  rD0(LT ) `+
+p1(r
I ; a)rI0
 
rL
 
LT

rL0
 
LT
  
rL
 
LT
  rD(LT )   ` = 0
and
p(rI ; a)
 
rL
 
LT
  rD(LT )  + (12)
+p(rI ; a)
 
rL0
 
LT
  rD0(LT ) ` +
+p1(r
I ; a)rI0
 
rL
 
LT

rL0
 
LT
  
rL
 
LT
  rD(LT )      ` = 0
where, exploiting symmetry between markets, we have dropped the market index from all
variables.
3.4.3 Free Entry Equilibrium
With explicit time dependence, the values of `t and `t that solve system (11)-(12) determine the
maximized values of domestic prots t and foreign prots t . These are the same for all banks
(t;HH = t;FF = t and t;HF = t;FH = t ) and are functions of the number of active banks
Nat . In turn, the equilibrium number of active rms is pinned down by the free entry condition
described in Section 3.1, which with symmetry becomes:
t + 

t = [1  (1  %)]: (13)
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in the determinist environment and:
Vt = t + 

t + (1  %)Et fVt+1g =  (14)
in the stochastic environment. Finally, the equilibrium values of `t, `t and Nat determine the
equilibrium deposit return rDt , loan return r
L
t , and risk-return prole (r
I
t ; p(r
I
t ; at)). Given the
number of incumbents, they also determine the equilibrium number of entrants by (1). The fact
that the equilibrium of the two national markets can be characterized by such a parsimonious set
of equations is obviously due to the assumption that the two markets are symmetric.
4 Qualitative and Quantitative Implications of the Model
We want to understand how competition and risk taking change when the parameters of the model
change. In particular, we want to analyze the equilibrium behavior of our model in the two
environments described in Section 3.1: a deterministic environment without aggregate shocks (at =
1) and a stochastic environment in which aggregate shocks make at follow a Markov stationary
process. We will rst characterize some analytical results for the more tractable deterministic case,
and then resort to numerical simulations for a broader investigation of both the deterministic and
stochastic environments. In doing so, we will work with specic functional forms satisfying the
assumptions on rL
 
DT

, rD(DT ) and p(rI ; a) laid out in the previous section.
4.1 Parametrization
To investigate the equilibrium behavior of the model (both analytically and numerically), it is
useful to specify simple functional forms that comply with the properties detailed in Section 3.2.
In the wake of Boyd and De Nicolo [4], we assume that the demand of loans and the supply of
deposits take the following forms:
rL
 
LTt

= at   1LTt with 1 > 0;
rD(DTt ) = D
T
t with  > 0:
(15)
We also assume that investment projects succeed with probability:
p(rIt ; at) =

at
 
1  rIt

for rI 2 [0; 1=]
0 otherwise
(16)
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Hence, for given returns, larger at increases the demand of loans by (15), the productivity of
projects by (4) as well as their success probability by (16). Accordingly, we will refer to larger
(smaller) at as better (worse) investment climate. Di¤erently, larger  decreases loan demand as
well as projectssuccess probability without a¤ecting their productivity.
4.2 Deterministic Equilibrium without Monitoring Costs
We characterize the deterministic equilibrium in two steps. In this section we provide an analytical
assessment for the simpler case in which  = 0. In the next section we assess the role of banking
globalization (as captured by an reduction of ) through numerical simulations.
As with at = 1 all variables are constant, we drop the time subscript. We can then use (15)
and (16) with a = 1 and DT = DT to rewrite rmsrst order condition (6) as:
rI =
1

  1
2
LT ; (17)
with associated success probability:
p =
1
2
LT : (18)
These expressions show that more loans (and thus more deposits) make rms choose invest-
ments with lower return and higher probability of success (i.e. with more cautious risk-return
prole). As for banksrst order conditions, (11) and (12) can be rewritten respectively as
LT

1

  (1 + )LT   

+

1

  2 (1 + )LT   

` = 0 (19)
and
LT

1

  (1 + )LT      

+

1

  2 (1 + )LT      

` = 0; (20)
where we again focus on the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which in both national
markets all home banks choose the same amount of loans `ss and all foreign banks choose the same
amount of loans `ss. Henceforth, we will use subscript ss to denote the values of all variables in
the deterministic equilibrium. Note that conditions (19) and (20) imply that in such equilibrium,
foreign banks facing the additional monitoring cost  > 0 end up being smaller than their home
competitors. Indeed, for any given LT , if the (19) holds for ` = `ss, then (20) can hold only for
17
` = `ss < `ss. Moreover, larger  is associated with smaller `ss relative to `ss, with `ss going to
zero for large enough . To summarize, when foreign banks face an additional monitoring cost,
they are smaller than their home competitors. The more so, the higher the monitoring cost. When
the monitoring cost is high enough, foreign banks do not operate in the home market.
Having discussed the role of  > 0, in order to further understand the role of the other
parameters of the model, it is useful to focus on the special case in which foreign banks face no
additional monitoring cost ( = 0). In this case, (19) and (20) are identical and can be solved for:
LTss(N
T
ss) = N
T
ssdss(N
T
ss) =
1
   
1 + 
NTss
1 % + 1
NTss
1 % + 2
(21)
with NTss(1   %) denoting the total number of active banks and Nss=(1   %) = NTss(1   %)=2
denoting the common number of home and foreign banks. Expression (21) shows that, as the
number of active banks NTss(1   %) increases, total loans LTss(NTss) also increase. Expressions (17)
and (18) then imply that, when more banks are active, rms target projects with lower return
rIss(N
T
ss) = 1=   1LTss(NTss)=2 and higher success probability pss = 1LTss(NTss)=2. This is the
net outcome of two opposing forces. On the one hand, increasing the number of banks strengthens
bankscompetition for deposit funds, weakening their oligopsony power in the deposits market and
thus raising the return on deposits as well as the total amount of deposits. For a given spread of
the loan rate over the deposit rate rL   rD, a larger number of active banks would increase the
deposit rate rD, therefore inducing rms to take more risk as rL would also increase. On the other
hand, a larger number of active banks also strengthens competition in loans provision, weakening
their oligopoly power in the loan market and thus reducing the return on loans rL for any given
deposit rate rD. With the assumptions embedded in the chosen functional forms, the downward
pressure on the loan rate dominates the upward pressure on the deposit rate, which induces rms
to reduce return and risk. Hence, more competition due to a larger number of home and foreign
banks makes rms target investments with lower return and lower probability of failure.
Thus far we have taken the number of active banks as exogenously given. Free entry implies,
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however, that this number is endogenously determined by (13):
ss(N
T
ss) =
1
 
1
   
3
(1 + )
2

NTss
1 % + 1
2
NTss
1 %

NTss
1 % + 2
3 = [1  (1  %)]: (22)
Implicit derivation of (22) shows that stronger demand of loans by rms and higher success
rate of their investments (as captured by lower ) cause a rise in the number of active banks
given dNTss=d < 0. This is accompanied by a higher number of entrants as in equilibrium (1)
implies NTe;ss = %N
T
ss=(1  %). By (21), larger NTss leads to a rise in both total and per-bank loans:
dLTss=d < 0 and d`ss=d < 0. Then, by (15), falling  and rising L
T
ss lead (on net) to higher
rates on deposits and loans: drDss=d < 0 and dr
L
ss=d < 0. Finally, by (17) and (18), falling  and
rising LTss also determine (on net) a rise in rmssuccess rate and in their return on investment:
dpss=d < 0 and drIss=d < 0. Hence, stronger demand of loans by rms and higher success rate
of their investments lead to an expansion of the banking sector along both the extensive margin
(number of active banks) and the intensive margin (deposits and loans per bank). Returns to
deposits, loans and investment all rise. Firms target less risky projects.
The e¤ects of lower insurance premium  are similar, though less complex as they are channeled
only through smaller NTss and L
T
ss (as  appears only in (21) and (22)). Those of lower entry cost
 are also similar but even more straightforward as they are channeled only through NTss (as 
appears only in (22)).
4.3 Deterministic Equilibrium with Monitoring Costs
When banks face additional monitoring costs for their foreign operations, we have to resort to
numerical investigation as analytical results are hard to obtain for  > 0. In particular, we compute
the deterministic equilibrium through Newton-Raphson iterations of the model system of equations.
Parameter calibration is summarized in Table 1 below. Notice that we have chosen parameter values
for the loan and deposit demand such that the second is less elastic than the rst. The discount
factor  is set so as to generate a 4% annual risk-free rate. The banksexit probability is set so
as to generate an annual exit rate of 4% consistently with data from the FDIC for the 2000s (see
also Hayashi, Grace Li and Wang [21]). The insurance costs are compatible with quarterly Initial
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Table 1: Calibration of parameters.
Free Parameters Mnemonics Value
Discount factor  0.985
Success probability parameter  0.7
Loan rate function 1 2
Deposit demand  3
Insurance cost  0.53
Entry cost  1.1
Exit probability  0.025
Monitoring cost  0.02
Basel Assessment rates (for Category I of risk) as of 2011. Monitoring costs are set according to
the quarterly loan loss provisions of banks in the U.S. and Europe.10
Our endogenous riskrefers to the overall default probability 1  p(rI ; a). If projects are per-
fectly correlated across rms, this probability corresponds also to the aggregate default risk, hence
to endogenous systemic risk. More generally, however, when projects are imperfectly correlated
across rms, systemic risk is not necessarily equivalent to 1  p(rI ; a). Martinez-Meira and Repullo
[26] show how the aggregate endogenous risk metric shall change when idiosyncratic project failures
are driven by a latent factor à la Vasicek [31] and projects are imperfectly correlated. In Section
5.2 we will show that changing the risk metric can quantitatively a¤ect the responses of the risk
variables, but does not change the agents optimization behavior and the incentives behind the
model mechanics. For this reason, in this section we focus on the simpler limiting case of perfectly
correlated projects as our baseline.
Figure 1 describes how banking globalization(lower ) a¤ects all the endogenous variables
in the model. In the panels of this gure the di¤erent variables are reported on the vertical axis
while  increases rightward along the horizontal axis. Hence, the e¤ects of banking globalization
can be read moving leftward. The gure show that, as already argued, falling  is accompanied by
an increase in the market share of foreign banks: deposits and loans per capita increase for foreign
banks and fall for domestic banks (second panel in the right column). Intensied competition leads
to an increase in the total amount of deposits and loans, a decrease in the return on loans and
an increase in the return on deposits. As the spread between loan and deposit rates shrinks, the
10See Bankscope data.
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number of banks falls causing a consolidation of the banking market. As for rms, lower loan rates
make them more cautious, targeting projects with lower return and higher probability of success.
Despite more caution the spread between the returns on investment and loans increases, whereas
the spread between the returns on loans and deposits decreases. Finally, note that for all values of
 the spread between loan and deposit rates is smaller for foreign than home banks once the the
monitoring cost is netted out. This reveals that banks practice dumpingin the sense of Brander
and Krugman [5]: they are willing to accept a lower spread for their foreign operations than for
their domestic ones and thus do not pass on the full additional costs of foreign operations to their
customers. This happens as banks perceive higher elasticities of loans demand and deposits supply
in their foreign market given that their market share is smaller there, and explains why costly cross-
hauling of identical banking services by banks headquartered in di¤erent national markets arises in
equilibrium despite monitoring costs. The partial absorption of monitoring costs by foreign banks
becomes less pronounced as  falls driving the perceived elasticities of loans demand and deposits
supply in their foreign market closer to the ones in their home market.
4.4 Stochastic Equilibrium with Monitoring Costs
We now investigate how the banking sector reacts when the investment climate is subjected to
shocks modelled through a Markov stationary process. The obvious di¤erence with respect to
the deterministic equilibrium will be that in a stochastic environment expectations will play a
role. Specically, we choose an autoregressive process for shocks and look at the impulse responses
of endogenous risk (rm default probability), bank entry, deposits/loans of domestic and foreign
banks, and the return on loans. We study how these responses change depending on the monitoring
cost (), the deposit insurance premium (), the entry cost () and the demand of loans ().
4.4.1 Quantitative Implementation
We study the dynamics of the model and the channels at work through stochastic simulations,
which take into account expectations about the future banksvalue function. In the presence of
random shocks to the investment climate, return to investment (17) becomes:
rIt =
1

  1
2at
LTt ; (23)
21
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
0 . 0 6 7 6
0 . 0 6 7 8
0 . 0 6 8
0 . 0 6 8 2
0 . 0 6 8 4
S u c c e s s  p ro b a b i l i t y
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
0 . 0 9 6 5
0 . 0 9 7
0 . 0 9 7 5
T o t a l  d e p o s i t s
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
0 . 1 2 4
0 . 1 2 6
0 . 1 2 8
T o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  b a n k s
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
0 . 5
1
F o re i g n  a n d  d o m e s t i c  d e p o s i t s  -  p e r  c a p i t a
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
1 . 3 3 1
1 . 3 3 1 5
1 . 3 3 2
R e t u rn  o n  i n v e s t m e n t
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
1 . 2 3 3
1 . 2 3 4
1 . 2 3 5
R e t u rn  o n  l o a n s
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
0 . 2 9
0 . 2 9 2
R e t u rn  o n  d e p o s i t s
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
4 . 2 2
4 . 2 4
4 . 2 6
S p re a d  re t u rn  l o a n -d e p o s i t s
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
1 . 0 7 8
1 . 0 7 8 5
1 . 0 7 9
S p re a d  re t u rn  i n v e s t m e n t -d e p o s i t s
0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2
4 . 1 6
4 . 1 8
S p re a d  l o a n -d e p o s i t s  n e t  o f  m o n i t o r i n g
Figure 1: Steady state values of selected variables when changing monitoring cost, :
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with associated success probability:
pt =
1
2
LTt : (24)
As in the deterministic equilibrium, these expressions show that, for given at, more loans (and thus
more deposits) make rms choose investments with lower return atrIt and higher probability of
success (i.e. a more cautious risk-return prole). On the other hand, for given LTt , an improvement
in the investment climate (larger at) makes rm invest in projects with unchanged probability of
success but higher return atrIt .
As (23) implies:
rI0t
 
rLt
 
LTt

rL0t
 
LTt

=   1
2at
; (25)
the banksrst order conditions (19) and (20) become respectively:
LTt
hat

  (1 + )LTt   
i
+
hat

  2 (1 + )LTt   
i
`t = 0 (26)
and
LTt
hat

  (1 + )LTt      
i
+
hat

  2 (1 + )LTt      
i
`t = 0; (27)
where we again focus on the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which all home banks choose
the same amount of loans `t and all foreign banks choose the same amount of deposits `t .
The complete system of equations consists of: the banksfree entry condition (14); the banks
rst order conditions (19) and (20); the denition of total loans (10); the expression of banks
operating prots
t + 

t =
1
2
LTt
hat

  (1 + )LTt   
i
`t +
1
2
LTt
hat

  (1 + )LTt      
i
`t :
This is a system of ve equations that can be solved numerically in the ve unknowns, `t, `t ,
LTt , Nt and t + 

t . Equation (1) can then be used to nd the corresponding number of entrants
N et .
4.4.2 Simulation Results
To assess how the banking sector reacts to changes in the investment climate, we present impulse
responses of selected variables to a 1% aggregate productivity shock (at). We perform stochastic
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simulations using higher order Taylor expansions of our model around the deterministic equilib-
rium.11 Productivity shocks are modelled as AR(1) processes taking the form of eat = eate"t , where
 is shock persistence and "t is an i.i.d. shock. Following most of the dynamic macro literature,  is
calibrated to a value of 0:98. The rest of the parameters is calibrated as in the previous section. In
each of the gures below we examine the impulse responses for di¤erent values of crucial parame-
ters. We do so for two reasons. First, globalization may take place for di¤erent motives. Certainly
a reduction of monitoring cost (smaller ) directly favors the entry of foreign banks. However,
the entry of foreign banks can also be fostered by stronger loan demand (smaller ), lower entry
barriers (smaller ) and lower insurance premium (smaller ). Examining how the response of the
banking sector changes for di¤erent value of those parameters will allow us to understand how the
various channels at work in our model operate.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of selected variables to the 1% productivity shock for
di¤erent values of the monitoring cost .
We start by examining the qualitative response of each variables for high and low values of .
An increase in productivity boosts project returns, hence fosters the entry of both domestic and
foreign banks. Both active banks and new entrants increase in number. As the market becomes
more competitive, per bank deposits and each banks market share fall (second panel to the left).
Overall credit, however, increases due to the increased number of active banks. This brings about
a fall in the loan returns. In turn, the fall in loan returns reduces risk-shifting incentives for rms,
which then move to select projects with lower returns and higher success probability. The latter
indeed increases on impact (rst panel). Hence endogenous risk (default probability) falls. A higher
value of  has a double e¤ect. On the one side, by increasing dumping, it induces banks to apply
a higher discount on loansrates (second panel to the right). This renders competition in the loan
market more aggressive. On the other side, higher monitoring costs reduce foreign prots and
foreign banksentry (which is endogenous in our case). Monitoring costs are per period operating
costs that a¤ect the banks intensive margin, namely the amount of deposits to be held in each
market. Through this they reduce the sensitivity of the risk prole to the loan rate. There are less
active banks and this reduces slightly the rmsrisk-shifting incentives. This second e¤ect tends
11See Judd [23].
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive productivity shock for di¤erent values
of  ( = 0:53).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive productivity shock for di¤erent values
of :
to partly counteract the rst, so that we observe a smaller increase in the success probability and
a smaller increase in the number of new entrants. At last, monitoring costs a¤ect bankschoice on
the relative operating scale between the domestic and the foreign markets. Higher monitoring costs
induce banks to decrease not only the relative scale of their foreign operations, but also, though to
a smaller extent, the absolute scale of their overall operations.
Figure 3 examines the response to the1% positive productivity shock for high and low values
of the insurance premium :
As before, the increase in expected revenues (today and in the future) induces more banks
to enter, reduces their market share (deposits per capita) and increases overall loan supply, which
in turn reduces loan rates and risk (the success probability increases on impact, see rst panel).
Responses are di¤erent for di¤erent values of the insurance premium. By providing loss coverage,
insurance induces higher banks risk-taking. As the insurance is the rst loss absorber in the
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive productivity shock for di¤erent values
of :
pecking order, its role is mainly that of dispensing banks from bearing any operating loss (beyond
the protection guaranteed by the limited liability). The impulse responses show that for higher
values of  the increase in success (the fall in endogenous risk) is larger. This is due to the fact
that the bank has an incentive to follow a more cautious behavior as a higher insurance premium
makes the bank share a larger part of the losses from loan default.
Figure 4 shows the response to the positive productivity shock for high and low values of .
The responses of the selected variables are to be interpreted as before. Regarding the role
of , recall that larger values of this parameter decrease loan demand as well as projectssuccess
probability for given at. Hence, larger  reduces investorshubris leading to less appetite for risk
and less banksentry.
Figure 5 shows the response for di¤erent values of the xed entry cost .
To interpret the role of the entry cost we can resort to option value theory. Banks enter when
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive productivity shock for di¤erent values
of .
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their future sum of discounted prots equate the entry cost. By solving recursively equation (2) we
can express this condition as:
 = Et
( 1X
z=t
((1  %))z t  p(rIt ; at)  rLt  LTt   rDt (LTt )   (`t + `t   `t )
)
(28)
The option value of opening a new branch or subsidiary is given by the discounted sum of future
banksrents. The higher is the entry barrier, the higher are the rents which the bank shall extract
to satisfy condition (28). Rentsextraction is reected in the fact that the bank decreases the loan
rate (and extracts higher market shares) by a larger extent when  is higher. In other words, banks
predatory incentives are higher when the initial sunk cost is higher.
At last, it is interesting to notice that the e¤ects of the monitoring costs di¤er for di¤erent
values of the insurance premium. Figure 6 shows the impulse responses for di¤erent values of 
and a value of  larger than in Figure 2. It is interesting to note that in this case an increase in
monitoring reduces risk (increases success probability). High insurance costs coupled with high
monitoring costs induce foreign banks to reduce their scale. This frees up deposit demand for
domestic banks, which on the contrary acquire market share. Overall, the adjustment is amplied
by the higher premium. The stronger increase in total loans induces a larger reduction in the loan
rate and a larger increase in success probability.
We can summarize all the channels operating in our model as follows. First, an improvement
in investment climate, by fostering entry and competition in loan markets reduces risk-shifting
incentives and induces banks to select better portfolios (see also Boyd and De Nicolo [4]). Due
to this e¤ect, foreign expansion induces a fall in risk. Second, entry in the foreign market fosters
bankspredatory incentives or dumping(see Brander and Krugman [5] for a similar e¤ect in the
trade literature). This e¤ect taken in isolation would reduce banksmargins for the non-defaulting
loans (see Martinez-Miera and Repullo [26]) and jeopardize banksportfolio sustainability; it would
hence increase banksrisk. However, in our model entry is endogenous, this implies that shifts in
the loan curves also change the relative market shares of all banks. By reducing loan rates, foreign
entrants also increase market shares. Overall, this dampens the fall in per period banksmargins
for non-defaulting loans. The increase in market shares raises the value of a bank that continues
to do business in the future (i.e. its charter value; see Vives [32]), and this reduces also its overall
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of selected variables to a positive productivity shock for di¤erent values
of  ( = 0:9).
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5 Cross-Border Lending and Systemic Risk
To conclude our analysis, we compare our results on the relation between multinational banking
and risk with perfectly correlated rm projectsoutcomes with those generated by two alternative
setups. In the rst, we substitute multinational banks with cross-border lenders that extend loans
in both markets but can only raise deposits in the market in which they are headquartered. In the
second, we revert to multinational banks but introduce systemic risk through imperfectly correlated
projectsoutcomes.
5.1 A Model of Cross-Border Lending
Internationalization for banks can take place in di¤erent forms. So far we have explored the possi-
bility of multinational banking, which materializes through the opening of branches or subsidiaries
in a foreign country that raise deposits and extend loans locally. An alternative to this business
model is cross-border lending whereby banks foreign operations are restricted to loan provision.
The di¤erence between these business models might be relevant in terms of risk-taking behavior.
Indeed, a recent IMF Financial Stability Report [24] shows that, prior to the nancial crisis of 2007,
global risk had increased since much of the nancial globalization took place through cross-border
activity with little involvement of global banks into local retail activity. The same report shows,
however, that after the crisis there has been a shift in the business model of global banks, which
currently tend to operate more through subsidiaries (occasionally through branches) and this shift
has been associated with a fall in banks risk. Our benchmark model shows, consistently with
evidence in the IMF report, expansion by multinationals can actually reduce risk-taking. It is,
therefore, worth examining whether expansion through cross-border activity can instead lead to
di¤erent conclusions.
We assume that, di¤erently from multinational banks, cross-border lenders have a lighter
foreign presence. This can be captured by a lower setup cost for foreign operations, which we
normalize to zero. Accordingly, the overall xed cost of a cross-border lender is    d, where 
and d are the overall xed cost and the subsidiary setup cost of a multinational bank respectively.
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A cross-border lender r headquartered in market H raises deposits Dr;H in its domestic market
and allocates them to domestic loans Lr;HH and foreign loans Lr;HF . We use Dr;HH and Dr;FH
to denote the complementary amounts of deposits allocated to loans in H and F respectively, so
that we have Dr;HH = Lr;HH , Dr;FH = Lr;FH and Dr;H = Dr;HH +Dr;HF = Lr;HH + Lr;HF . The
lender then chooses Lr;HH and Lr;HF so as to maximize expected prot:
H = p(r
I
H ; aH)
 
rLH
 
LTH

Lr;HH   rDH(DTH)Lr;HH   Lr;HH

+p(rIF ; aF )
 
rLF
 
LTF

Lr;HF   rDH(DTH)Lr;HF   Lr;HF   Lr;HF

 

  d

:
The rst order condition for prot maximization is:
@H
@Lr;HH
= p1(r
I
H ; aH)r
I0
H
 
rLH

rL0H
 
LTH
  
rLH
 
LTH

Lr;HH   rDH(DTH)Lr;HH   Lr;HH

(29)
+p(rIH ; aH)
 
rL0H
 
LTH

Lr;HH + r
L
H
 
LTH
  rD0H (DTH)Lr;HH   rDH(DTH)  
 p(rIF ; aF )rD0H (DTH)Lr;HF = 0
Note that, as higher Lr;HH increases interest payments also for deposits used for Lr;FH , the
lenders rst order condition can not be separated between markets as it was the case with multi-
national banks. This generates a novel trade-o¤. On the one hand, as rDH(D
T
H) increases with D
T
H ,
being forced to tap a single market for deposits drives the deposit return up, which by itself would
increase the loan rate. On the other hand, the lack of foreign competition for domestic deposits
puts downward pressure on the deposit return, which by itself would decrease the loan rate. Hence,
for the same number of banks, it is not obvious whether one should expect cross-border lending to
lead to more or less risk taking than multinational banking.
For simplicity, we focus on the symmetric deterministic equilibrium with  = 0 and a = 1.
In this case, symmetry implies that in equilibrium the total amount of loans o¤ered by home and
foreign banks in a market equals the total amount of deposits raised in the same market (LT = DT ).
This is due to the fact that home and foreign banks supply the same amounts of deposits rather
than to the fact that banks can nance loans only with local deposits as in the case of multinational
banks. Using our functional forms (15) and (16), the rst order condition (29) becomes
LT

1

  (1 + )LT   

+

1

  2 (1 + )LT   

`  LT ` = 0:
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Hence, after imposing LT = Na`, we can solve for the total amount of loans extended by cross-
border lenders in each market:
LTcbl = N
a` =
1
   
1 + 
(Na + 1)  12
(Na + 2) +

Na + 1+
 ; (30)
which shows that, also in the case of cross-border lending, a larger number of active banks raises
the total amount of loans, thus reducing risk-taking. Expression (30) can be compared with its
analogue (21) in the case of multinational banks:
LTmnb = N
a` =
1
   
1 + 
Na + 1
Na + 2
:
Three comments are in order. First, for a given number of active banks Na, cross-border
lenders raise a smaller total amount of deposits and thus supply a smaller total amount of loans
(LTcbl < L
T
mnb). Second, for a given initial number of active banks N
a, the increase in competition
caused by the same increase in the number of active banks leads to a smaller increase in deposits and
loans with cross-border lenders than with multinational banks (dLTcbl=dNa < dL
T
mnb=dNa). Hence,
for given Na, multinational banking generates less risk taking than cross-border lending (pcbl >
pmnb) and more competition reduces risk by a larger extent (dpcbl=dNa < dpmnb=dNa). Third,
when instead the number of active banks is endogenously determined by free entry, multinational
banking still generates less risk than cross-border lending provided that the additional xed cost
of setting up a foreign subsidiary is not too large. Too see this, note that, for given Na and net of
the corresponding overall entry cost, the maximized prot of a cross-border lender evaluates to:
cbl =
1
 
1
   
3
( + 1)
2
(2Na + 1)2

5+31
+1
+ 2Na

8Na

3+21
+1
+ 2Na
3   [1  (1  %)]  d ;
while, by (22), the prot of a multinational bank evaluates to:
mnb =
1
 
1
   
3
(1 + )
2
(Na + 1)2
Na (Na + 2)3
  [1  (1  %)]:
Both cbl and mnb are decreasing in Na and go to zero as Na goes to innity. However, it
can be shown that the multinational banks prot gross of the overall entry cost is larger than the
cross-border lenders for any value of Na. It then follows that for d = 0 the multinational banking
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free entry condition mnb = 0 holds for a value of Na that is larger than the one at which the
cross-border lending free entry cbl = 0 holds. By continuity, this also holds for d > 0 provided
that d is not too large. Otherwise, when d is large enough, the reverse happens with mnb = 0
holding for a value of Na that is smaller than the one at which cbl = 0 holds. Higher risk taking
associated with cross-border lending is in line with evidence reported by the IMF [24] that the
increase in cross-border lending prior to the 2007 produced larger default after the crisis erupted
and this was followed by extensive re-trenchment (see also Milesi-Ferretti and Tille [27]).
5.2 Systemic Risk and Competition
The measure of bank risk we have considered so far is based on the assumption that all projects
succeed with probability p(rI ; a) (and fail conversely). Moreover, the fact that realization of the
aggregate productivity shock is observed before any decision is made by rms and banks implies
that the probability of banksportfolio failure (the metric for bankssystemic risk) is equal to the
simple average of the probability of project failure, which is obviously again p(rI ; a). In reality
such an extreme risk correlation across projects is hardly observed and aggregate shocks occur also
after banks have made their portfolio decisions, in which case banksportfolio may fail ex post
despite the control banks have on p(rI ; a) through the loan rate ex ante. It is therefore important
to check how our ndings change when projects have less extreme degrees of risk correlation and
additional shocks happen after banks have already made irreversible portfolio decisions. To this
purpose we extend our benchmark model of multinational banks to allow for imperfect correlation
of projectsoutcomes due to common (systematic) and idiosyncratic ex post shocks. In doing so, we
follow the established practice in the literature of conditioning projectsoutcomes on common and
idiosyncratic factors in the wake of Vasicek [31] as, for example, in Martinez-Miera and Repullo [26]
and Bruno and Shin [6]. This allows us to capture possible inter-connections, asset commonality
or other features that make the probability of banksportfolio failure di¤erent from the simple
average of failure probability across projects. By checking the relation between entry and the
resulting metric of systemic risk we can also check how competition and risk taking interact in
presence of contagion e¤ects. As we will see, our main result on the negative impact of entry on
risk taking will stand, albeit with qualication.
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We abstract from the aggregate productivity shock (at = a = 1) but, di¤erently from the
deterministic environment we analyzed before, we now allow projects to be subject to a risk of
failure determined not only by rmschoices of the risk-return prole but also by the realizations of
common and idiosyncratic factors. In particular, as in Martinez-Miera and Repullo [26], we assume
that there is a continuum of rms indexed i and that the outcome of the project chosen by any
given rm i is determined by the realizations of a random variable yi dened as
yi =   1(1  pi) +pz +
p
1  "i; (31)
where  is the cumulative density function of a standard normal distribution while z and "i are
the common and idiosyncratic risk factors with distributions that are also independently standard
normal. The project of rm i fails when the realization of yi is negative. The parameter  2 [0; 1]
measures the relative importance of the systematic risk factor with respect to the idiosyncratic one
in determining the projects outcome, that is, the degree of risk correlation among projects. For
 = 0 failures are statistically independent across rms; for  = 1 they are perfectly correlated; for
 2 (0; 1) they are imperfectly correlated.
Given that both risk factors are generated by independent standard normal distributions, the
probability of failure evaluates to Pr

yi

= 1   pi. Hence, given (4), rm i chooses its risk-return
prole (pi; rI;i) to maximizes expected prot pi(rI;i   rL) subject to rI;i = (1  pi)= as per (16).
As all rms face the same loan return, the rst order condition implies that they all choose the
same success probability:
p =
1  rL
2
(32)
with the same associated return rI = (1 + rL)=2. Once more, the fact that probability p
is a decreasing function of rL reveals the presence of a risk-shifting e¤ect: faced with higher loan
return, rms select projects with higher failure rate 1  p.
As the (ex ante) risk-return prole chosen by rms before risk factors are realized is the same
across rms and we have a continuum of rms, the Law of Large Numbers implies that (ex post)
the share of projects that succeed (i.e. the aggregate success rate) depends only the realization of
the common risk factor z and coincides with the probability of success of the representative rm
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conditional on the realization z:
&(z) = Pr
h
  1(1  p) +pz +
p
1  "i  0 j z
i
= 1  

 1(1  p) pzp
1  

;
where we have used the fact that "i follows a standard normal distribution. As also z follows a
standard normal distribution, the cumulative density of the aggregate success rate { is then given
by:
G({) = Pr [&(z)  {] = 

 1(1  p) p1   1 (1  {)p


: (33)
According to (33), the success rate has mean p while  regulates the dispersion around the
mean with larger  associated with more dispersion. In the limit, for ! 0, G({) becomes a Dirac
delta function that is zero everywhere except at { = p: with independent failures a fraction p of
projects succeed with probability 1. For  ! 1, G({) converges to p: with perfectly correlated
failures all projects succeed with probability p and fail with probability 1  p as in our benchmark
case.
Having characterized the underlying risk we can now restate the banksoptimization problem,
assuming for simplicity that there is no additional monitoring cost for foreign operations ( = 0)
and that markets are characterized by their own un-correlated common risk factors. A typical bank
is active as long as the realized success rate is large enough to generate non-negative net cash ow:
2{m(LT )`    0,
wherem(LT ) = rL
 
LT
 rD(LT )  is the lending-to-deposit rate spread (net of the insurance
premium) and  = [1  (1  %)] is the annuity value of the overall xed cost  (which the bank
nances in the capital market upon entry). This non-negativity condition generates a cuto¤ rule
of survival: the bank will be active as long as the realized success rate { does not fall short of the
threshold:
e{ = 
2m(LT )`
: (34)
Note that in our benchmark case ( = 1) the cuto¤ would be immaterial (e{ = 1). Totally
di¤erentiating (34) in the symmetric equilibrium (` = LT =Na) gives:
d ln e{
d lnNa
= 1 

1 +
d lnm(LT )
d lnLT

d lnLT
d lnNa
; (35)
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which shows that the sign of the elasticity of the cuto¤ success rate e{ to changes in the
number of active rms Na is determined by the sign of the elasticity of the lending-to-deposit rate
spread m(LT ) to aggregate loans LT and the sign of the elasticity of aggregate loans LT to the the
number of active rms Na. With our functional forms (15), the sign of the former is negative as
m0(LT ) =   (1 + ). To sign the latter we have, instead, to analyze the optimization problem of
the typical bank. This maximizes prot
 (` ; `) = h(` ; `)`  ;
with:
h(` ; `) = 2 (1 G(e{ (` ; `))) Ee{(` ;`)({) m((Na   1) `  + `)
where `  refers to the vector of loans by the other Na 1 banks (hence LT = (Na   1) ` + `),
the dependence of e{ on ` ; ` has been made explicit, and Ee{(` ;`)({) = R 1e{(` ;`) {dG({)= (1 G(e{ (` ; `)))
is the conditional mean success rate. The function h(` ; `) is the generalizedresidual demand in
the sense of Martinez-Miera and Repullo [26]. Note however that, di¤erently from their setup, here
the bank a¤ects the cuto¤ success rate e{ not only indirectly through its e¤ect on total loans LT
but also directly through ` whereas the prot margin m(LT ) does not depend on {. In the case of
perfectly correlated project failures ( = 1), the banks problem boils down to the one we already
solved for the benchmark case as (1 G(e{ (` ; `)))Ee{(` ;`)({) = p with p given by (32).
The banks maximization problem is well dened as long as h(` ; `) is decreasing and concave
in ` (i.e. h0(LT ) < 0 and h00(LT ) < 0) as this ensures that the necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for prot maximization are met. Henceforth, we assume that parameter values are such that those
properties hold. The rst order condition requires h2(` ; `)`+h(` ; `) = 0, which in the symmetric
equilibrium (`  = ` = Na=LT ) implies:
h0(LT )
LT
Na
+ h(LT ) = 0:
Total di¤erentiation then yields:
dLT
dNa
=   h(L
T )
h00(LT )LT + h0(LT ) (Na + 1)
> 0; (36)
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with the sign granted by h0(LT ) < 0 and h00(LT ) < 0. Accordingly, given (15) and (32), we
have drL=dNa < 0 and dp=dNa > 0 respectively. This shows that more competition (due to a
larger number of active banks) lowers the probability of default of the loans in banksportfolios
1 p. However, as pointed out by Martinez-Miera and Repullo [26], that does not necessarily imply
lower probability of failure Pr [{  e{].
Indeed, using the cumulative density function (33), the probability of failure can be written
as:
G(e{) =  1(1  p) p1   1 (1  e{)p


;
which shows that, as Na increases, the ensuing fall in 1   p may be contrasted by a parallel
rise in 1  e{. This requires d ln e{=d lnNa > 0, which by (35) and (36) in turn requires the negative
impact of a larger number of active banks on the lending-to-deposit rate spread to be strong enough
relative to the parallel positive impact on the total provision of loans and deposits:
d lnLT
d lnNa
+
d lnm(LT )
d lnNa
< 1: (37)
This is a necessary condition for the probability of portfolio failure to rise despite lower proba-
bility of default of the loans in the portfolios. It would hold, for example, if aggregate bank prots
fell with bank entry: d ln
 
m(LT )LT

=d lnNa = d lnLT =d lnNa + d lnm(LT )=d lnNa < 0. Vice
versa, the result of our benchmark model that banks competition reduces the risk would carry
through to the case of imperfectly correlated projectsreturns if condition (37) were violated as in
such case we would have d ln e{=d lnNa < 0. In other words, a su¢ cient condition for our benchmark
result to extend to the more general setup is that expansionary impact of competition on active
banksprots through total loans and deposits is strong enough to o¤set its parallel contractionary
impact through the lending-to-deposit rate spread. (d ln
 
m(LT )LT

=d lnNa  0).
6 Conclusion
Venturing into foreign markets can enrich banksopportunities, but can also have unintended con-
sequences for risk-taking. It has, however, been argued that direct involvement in local retail
activities promotes competition and, through this channel, reduces risk-taking. We have proposed
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a model in which imperfectly competitive banks are allowed to operate simultaneously in di¤er-
ent national markets with direct involvement in local retail activities both on the deposit and the
loan sides. Our banks make endogenous entry decisions and select the risk-return proles of their
loan portfolios anticipating borrowersrisk-shifting due to limited liability. We have shown that, if
borrowersproject success exhibits decreasing hazard rate, our model indeed predicts that direct
involvement in retail activities reduces risk-taking provided that the expansionary impact of com-
petition on multinational banksaggregate prots through larger scale is strong enough to o¤set
its parallel contractionary impact through lower loan-deposit return margin. This holds with both
perfectly and imperfectly correlated loans risk. Numerically we have also shown that banking
globalization moderates the contraction in the number of banks, in total deposits and loans, in the
return on deposits, in the return on loans and in the success probability of rmsprojects following
a deterioration in the global investment climate. Finally, comparing a version of our model fea-
turing cross-border lending with the benchmark one featuring multinational banks, we have found
that also in the former case more competition can reduce risk-taking, but to a lesser extent than
in the latter.
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7 Appendix A. FirmsLoan Demand
Assume there is a continuum of entrepreneurs whose outside options h follow a distribution with
cdf G(h) for h  0. Each entrepreneur can make only one unit investment yielding return
p(rI ; a)(arI   rL) (38)
As a result investment is governed by a cuto¤rule. Only entrepreneurs for whom p(rI ; a)(arI rL) 
ht actually invest where h corresponds to the outside option of marginal entrepreneurs who are
indi¤erent between investing or not: h = p(rI ; a)(arI   rL).
In this setup, the demand for loans is equal to the total number of entrepreneurs that invest
L = G(h) = G(p(rI ; a)(arI   rL)) (39)
where rI and rL are linked by the FOC:
d(p(rI ; a)(arI   rL))
drI
= p1(r
I ; a)(arI   rL) + p(rI ; a)a = 0 (40)
In order to nd under which conditions rL(L) to satises rL0(L) < 0 and rL00(L)  0, we can
totally di¤erentiate the second last equation and use FOC to obtain
dL
drL
=  g(p(rI ; a)(arI   rL))p(rI ; a) < 0 (41)
and then
d2L
d (rL)2
= g0(p(rI ; a)(arI   rL))  p(rI ; a)2  0 (42)
as long as
g0(:)  0 (43)
Note that d2L=d
 
rL
2  0 i¤ d2rL=d (L)2  0.
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